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IMPACT OF WORLD CONDITIONS ON
THE LEGAL PROFESSION
ROBERT G. STOREY,
President of the American Bar Association

(An address delivered at the 54th annual convention of the
Colorado Bar Association, October 11, 1952.)
In considering present trends and conditions of the legal profession in the United States, a brief glance into modern history
prior to World War II and subsequent to the Japanese surrender
will disclose a few of the basic issues. Prior to the beginning of
World War II there were four major legal systems: (a) AngloAmerican, with its underlying common law principles. This system of law was the basic concept for the judiciary and legal profession in England and her dominions and in the United States
and her territories. The American Revolution had no particular
effect upon the underlying legal system. We retained the principle
of an independent judiciary following our independence from
England. The principles of common law were accepted unless constitutional or statutory changes were made.
(b) Continental, with a basic change produced under Code
Napoleon following the Napoleonic Wars. The Continental legal
reforms of the later 18th century had general application in Western European countries. However, legal systems of Continental
Europe were largely directed through a Ministry of Justice which
had political control.
(c)
Soviet Legal System, following the seizure of power by
the Bolsheviks after the Russian Revolution which resulted in subordination of individual rights to state control and elimination of
private ownership of productive property. The Soviet system of
justice was and is designed as an "agency of the State to assist the
Government and party in power to achieve the aims of the Party
and State." The whole concept of Soviet justice is to protect the
State and subordinate the right of the individual.
(d) The Japanese Meiji Legal System which purported to
abolish the legal traditions of feudal Japan and following a legal
system patterned largely after the Prussian system of law. Again
under the Meiji Restoration the judicial system was subordinated
to political power vested in a Ministry of Justice.
What are the changes since World War II? Let us take a brief
look at the four principal legal systems as affected by World War
II: (a) Anglo-American is still basically the same. England still
maintains her independent judiciary, regardless of political changes.
Likewise, the basic system of law remains in the principal states
that have become independent since World War II. The United
States has an independent system and the Philippines and Puerto
Rico have legal systems following the general United States system
of law.
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(b)
The Continental System has undergone radical changes.
There is a definite trend to eliminate political control of the judicial
systems. West Germany is a notable example, having adopted in
principle our independent legal system.
(c)
The Soviet Judicial System is basically the same except
the rights of the individual have been drastically curtailed. Prior
to World War I this system only affected 200 million people. Now
it extends to one-third the inhabitants of the world.
(d)
The Japanese have abolished the whole Meiji concept of
a dependent judiciary and legal profession and substituted a new
constitution patterned after the United States with a judicial
section embracing the most modern reforms, including the best
principles of the New Jersey, Missouri and California judicial
systems.
What are the results? Two dominant legal systems remainthe Anglo-American and the Soviet. While many of the countries in
other parts of the world cling to their old ideas of a dependent
legal system, the trend is definitely toward an independent legal
system with the basic concepts of the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence. Certainly the prevailing legal systems of the world
are only two-the Anglo-American and the Soviet.
As lawyers how do we define the differences between the two
systems? In the Soviet it is admitted by all current Soviet writers,
including Foreign Minister Vishinsky, that "law is a tool of the
State." The practice of law has likewise been regulated by the
State until now the lawyer is not free to represent his client and
urge any defense that he deems wise under the facts and the law.
In the trial of criminal cases the Soviet defense lawyer has the
same fear of complicity in the crime of his client as the defendant
himself. His legal education, hours of practice and fees are all
subject to regulation by the State. The judges no longer have
judicial freedom. The favorite People's Court of the Soviet judicial
system often contains more laymen than regularly trained judges.
They dare not render a decision that would not have the approval
of the Politburo and its politicians.
In the cold and hot war that is being waged throughout the
world one of the basic issues is which system of justice will survive.
At this point I believe it would be helpful to review the present
world conditions, based upon my recent personal observations.
The world is in ferment. Unrest, even fear, exists almost
everywhere. Hot wars are being fought in Korea, Indo-China,
Malaya, Indonesa and the Philippines, with sporadic riots in Iran,
Egypt, India and elsewhere. While many of these wars, riots and
incidents are far apart geographically, there is a common theme
or objective. Earmarks of the master strategy of the Kremlin may
be found in all. The major danger spots in the cold war area are:
The divided cities of Berlin and Jerusalem;
Iran and the Middle East and the borders of India and Hong
Kong. While the danger in many states is due to Nationalism,
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Communism plays an important part. Joe Stalin and his cohorts
in the Kremlin watch every move and capitalize upon every favorable turn of events. When a vacuum is created, the Communists
move in; often they help create the vacuum. That is exactly what
happened in Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary, Poland, Albania, China
and Korea. Today Iran is hanging in the balance.
Time will not permit a discussion of all and I shall only comment upon three areas: Berlin, Jerusalem and Korea.
First, BERLIN. This city of over three million Germans is
divided into four sectors with, generally speaking, the Soviets in
the East and the British, French and Americans in the Western
areas. The entire city is surrounded by the Soviet-Zone. Berlin is
an island state completely encircled by a sea of Communism. All of
us are familiar with the constant border clashes, killings and traffic
stoppage. Today West Germany is a booming nation with practically no unemployment, yet West Berlin has more than 300,000,
unemployed. Why? Business firms do not send orders to Berlin
industries as they do to West Germany because of the fear of a
blockade and questionable delivery. While I was there in late July,
the Soviets abolished all the East German States and substituted
Soviet Administrative Districts with their own system of laws by
decrees. I had the opportunity to talk with numbers of judges and
lawyers who escaped from the Eastern Zone, leaving their homes
and property behind in order to be free again. More than 1700
lawyers and judges had fled to safety in the Western Zone during
the past four years. A notable example of the border incidents
was the brutal and illegal kidnapping of Dr. Walter Linse, an eminent lawyer in West Berlin. His fate is still unknown. His brave
and cultured wife came before the meeting I attended with shocking facts. I have a copy of the alleged confession of his stenographer who betrayed him, which was published in the East Berlin
Soviet newspaper while our conference was in progress. As prominent judges and lawyers from 42 free nations of the world condemmed this brutal kidnapping and the system of injustice behind
the Iron Curtain, the Soviet radio constantly referred to our meeting as "the legal gangsters". They were amazed at the action of
the lawyers of the free world in condemning their acts. This incident is only one among many. Courageous Mayor Reuter of Berlin is a great leader and he assured us that he and the people of
West Berlin will stand together as a unit against the Soviet regime
of slavery and tyranny.
Second, JERUSALEM. The Holy City today is seething with
hatred and fear. Armed men behind barbed wire try to maintain
the truce line that runs along Holy ground. Much of the old City
has been destroyed. Approximately 800,000 Palestinian Arab refugees merely exist in tents, caves and old buildings in Syria, Jordan
and Lebanon. All are ready to give their lives if necessary to regain
their homes and property. The peoples of the Arab world have no
love for the United States, since they believe we are responsible for
much of the chaos and misery.

DICTA

Nov., 1952

Third, KOREA. The war there is grim, hot and costly in United
States lives and money. The ground battle line meanders along
peaks and valleys for 110 miles. We are no longer fighting the
North Koreans (only a small number oppose us). Our real enemies
are the Communists-Chinese and Russian. Our brave young
Americans every day are being shot down by Soviet-made airplanes
and anti-aircraft artillery. It is very strange to view actual combat
films, as I did just a few weeks ago, and see three big Communist
air bases just across the Yalu River. All our airmen can do is to
look. Our boys even watch the enemy planes take off against them
but can do nothing until they gain altitude and cross the river, with
the advantage of altitude and position.
The Communists are dug deep into the high, rocky mountains.
They are protected by caves, solid rock bunkers and overhead shellproof reinforcements. I hesitate to think of the toll of lives necessary to break that line.
The truce talks are a farce. Our representative, General Harrison, pitches horseshoes to pass away the time. While these talks
have lingered on for one and one-third years the United Nations
Forces have suffered approximately 10,000 casualties while the
Communists have brought in 400,000 additional reserve soldiers
and substantial supplies. We will never obtain an honorable truce
unless we win a definite and substantial military victory.
While I have given you the dark side of the picture, lets take
a glance at the bright side. It is a paradox that our two defeated
enemies, West Germany and Japan, are recovering more rapidly
than other nations. They are working, business is good, and no
starvation exists. Moreover, they are following our form of constitutional democratic government with an independent judiciary
and legal profession. We need them and they need us in the struggle
with Communism.
Turkey is another oasis in the world desert of uncertainty.
The Turks are working hard. No doubt exists as to their loyalty
to the Western powers. They have a good army and are tough
fighters. Turkey is a great anchor for freedom at the outpost of
the free world.
Greece is another strong ally. Her people have faced the bloody
side of Communism with bravery and patriotism. However, inflation is rampant.
The little country of Thailand is a land where people have
plenty to eat, export rice, and cooperate with the United States.
The United States is unquestionably the leader of the free
world. Statesmen and just plain citizens everywhere recognize this
situation. Recent events have created colossal problems of leadership at home and abroad. We are in the front line of the death
struggle in the cold and hot war with Communism. The issues are
plain: the forces of liberty and freedom are arrayed against those
of tyanny and oppression.
Grave dangers are on the horizon. President Truman, Gen-
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eral Eisenhower and Governor Stevenson have each in recent weeks
emphasized that "we are in the greatest peril of our history." We
need clear thinking, hard work and unfaltering patriotism. Are we
forever to live in two worlds, hostile and hopeless, under a pall of
fear? We cannot retreat further. We should assume the initiative
and not the defensive. By this I do not mean we should start a preventive war or drop the atom bomb now, but I do advocate these
measures:
1. Create a global strategy and a definite nonpartisan foreign
policy. Non-office holding leading citizens should have an important
part in formulating such a policy.
2. We can not feed and rebuild the entire world and remain
strong ourselves. We should concentrate upon a few strategic spots
after a definite policy is established.
3. We can prevent the success through military force of the
Soviet plan of world domination. This means a policy of alertness
and strength. It means, too, the willingness to meet any challenge
on the field of battle at any time.
4. Stop the useless truce talks in Korea and take the necessary steps to bring about a denfinite military victory so that the
Communists would be seeking an armistice from us on satisfactory
terms.
5. We can ultimately defeat this ancient idea of dictator rule
by championing the supremacy of law throughout the free world.
Where law is supreme, tyranny can never be. We must exert our
influence to maintain the supremacy of law in all non Soviet regions.
6. We can apply the pressure of ideas upon the Soviet world.
They may build a wall to the skies but the light of knowledge can
not be kept entirely out. In this struggle of ideas we have an
enormous advantage, we do not fear the propaganda of the Soviets
-they fear our truth. We do not seek to prevent contact between
our people and theirs; they are the ones who oppose the restrictions
-we do not disturb their radio broadcasts; they try to jam ours.
Theirs is a police state-ours a free state.
We cannot divorce problems in the legal profession from those
of general world conditions, because one is affected by the other.
Courageous and bold leadership is the crying demand of the hour
in political and legal circles. Fear should be banished. I have an
abiding faith in our legal profession to arise to the challenge of the
hour but we cannot "muddle through." It takes courage, faith and
hard work. What are some specific objectives that the legal profession can achieve in this world crisis? The following appear to me
as within our capabilities:
1. We must continue to improve the procedure under our
judicial system to terminate litigation, both civil and criminal, more
speedily and effectively. Certainly, we have made progress in many
states and localities but there are still many places where justice
is delayed and the chances for immediate trial are remote. I believe
that one of the most effective reforms necessary along this line is
for lawyers and judges throughout the United States to encourage
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and establish the American Bar Association plan for selection of
judges. The pre-war philosophy of leaving the selection of our
judges-especially appellate judges-for decision by the voters is
cumbersome, political and not conducive to the prompt and effective
administration of justice. Our judges cannot be absolutely independent in thought and action as long as they must depend upon
election by direct vote of the people at large. To say the least, it
encourages judges to be politicians. Moreover, judges and friends
of judges should not be subjected to the terrific expense involved in
state and district political campaigns. Under the American Bar plan
the best points of the appointive system are preserved at the same
time leaving to the voters the right and privilege of disapproving
the record of any judge.
2. We need a complete overhaul of our traffic courts. More
than twenty million people appear before traffic courts each year.
The general opinion of the administration of justice is formed by
those defendants. Moreover, these are not the usual professional
criminals, but first and second offenders and, in many instances,
your son or daughter and mine. The fee system should be abolished
in all courts, including the traffic courts.
3. With the worldwide conflict between the free and Soviet
worlds and with the system of justice at issue, we must improve
our legal system. As we are the acknowledged leaders of the world,
those in other lands who are wavering between joining with the
free world and the Soviet world are keenly observing our institutions, including the judicial system. We need bold collecti e and
individual leadership in our legal system. We need more individual
leaders of the caliber and stature of Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt and Judge Harold R. Medina. Also, we need more dynamic
bar associations with courage to fight for the principles of an independent judiciary and legal profession. The Bar Association of
the City of New York, in cooperation with the Federal Judiciary
Committee of the American Bar Association, is a fine example.
The lawyers of that city had the courage to oppose the nomination of the President for a United States judge to occupy the
bench to which Judge Medina was appointed. Through the leadership of that Association, the President's nominee was not confirmed
and the Bar Association exercised its prerogative of leadership,
affirmatively recommending Judge Harold R. Medina, and you and
I are familiar with the results.
4. The people of the United States and the world are looking to
the lawyers of the United States to lead the fight for the improvement of an independent legal profession-not only relating to the
maintenance of an independent judiciary-but as leaders in great
issues that confront the United States and the world. The people
of our land, from the smallest county to the largest metropolis, are
yearning for leadership. No class of our people are more qualified
by education and experience than the lawyers to mold the thought
and to direct the policies of our citizens along the path of maintaining and improving our legal system.
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THE TREATY-MAKING POWER-A REAL
AND PRESENT DANGER
HONORABLE ORIE L. PHILLIPS,
United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

At the outset, I want to make it perfectly clear that this is
not an attack upon the United Nations with respect to its primary
function of preventing aggression and maintaining peace and order
in the world. With respect to those functions, I have ardently
supported the organization, both in public addresses and in written articles.
It may be well to preface this discussion with certain fundamental concepts with respect to which I think we may be in substantial agreement.
Our Federal government is, and should continue to be, one
of delegated and limited powers. Its powers should be limited to
matters that are national in scope and character and matters which
are essentially local in character should be reserved to the states
and the people, with the power to deal with them in the light of
peculiar local conditions and problems which differ widely throughout the various sections of our great country.
In a country as vast as ours, with varying local conditions and
problems, the expansion of Federal power with respect to matters
not national in scope and character means inefficiency in administration, extravagance in expenditures of public funds, and an
expansion of bureaucracy with its tendency to become a rule of
men rather than of law, to promulgate a maze of rules and regulations, without regard, and in many instances, unsuited to local
conditions and problems, and to become arbitrary and tyrannical
in the administration and in the enforcement of such rules and
regulations.
Because of these things, it is my firm conviction that the
preservation of the rights and powers of the states and the principles of local self-government is essential to the maintenance of
liberty and the fundamental freedoms of the individual.
Perhaps the question arises in your mind, why does the
treaty-making power under provisions of our Federal Constitution, which have not been changed since its adoption, now give
rise to questions of supreme importance. There are three reasons:
(1) In what is otherwise a government of limited and delegated powers under the Constitution, no express limitation exists
on the treaty power, and the existence of any implied limitations
is shrouded in doubt; (2) A basic change of viewpoint is being
carried into effect with respect to the functions and purpose of
treaties. A veritable avalanche of new treaties is under consideration by the United Nations and its affiliated organizations in the
social, economic, cultural, civil and political fields. It is reliably
reported that they have 200 treaties "in the works";' and (3) PerJessup, .A Moder

Law u! Nation,.
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sistent efforts have been made during the past two decades to find
additional constitutional basis for expansion of the powers of the
Federal government, and the treaty power has been seized upon
as a conveniently available vehicle for such expansion.
The issue presented is whether a constitutional amendment
limiting the treaty-making power is necessary to preserve the reserved powers of the states and the principle of local self government and to safeguard the rights and liberties of our people.
Until recently it was a fundamental concept of international
law that it is a law between states and not between individuals or
between individuals and states.
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations
and depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the honor
of the governments which are parties to it. If dishonored, its
infraction becomes the subject of international reclamation and
negotiation. At the time the Constitution was adopted and until
recently, treaties entered into by the United States generally
were compacts in that primary sense, imposing duties and obligations on the contracting states and not on individual citizens. True,
under the supreme law provision of our Constitution, a self-executing treaty becomes municipal law in the United States and such
a treaty may confer rights upon citizens or subjects of a signatory
nation, residing in the United States, which partake of the nature
of municipal law and which are capable of enforcement as between
private parties in the courts. An illustration is found in treaties
which regulate the mutual rights of the citizens and subjects of
the contracting parties with respect
to the devolution of property
2
to aliens by devise or inheritance.
Mr. Hamilton in The Federalist,No. 75, referring to the treaty
power, said:
It relates neither to the execution of the subsisting
laws, nor to the enaction of new ones; and still less to an
exertion of the common strength. Its objects are contracts with foreign nations, which have the force of law,
but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are
not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but
agreements between sovereign and sovereign.
Mr. Jefferson, in his Manual of ParliamentaryPractice, had
this to say:
By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution must have intended to comprehend only those objects
which are usually regulated by treaties, and cannot be
otherwise regulated.
It must have meant to except out all those rights
reserved to the states; for surely the President and the
Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole government is
interdicted from doing in any way.
But that view ceased to prevail with the decision of the Su2 Head

Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598.
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preme Court in Missouri v. Holland,3 as I shall presently show.
Today, however, treaties are being proposed, and at least one
has been submitted to the Senate for ratification, which impose
civil and criminal liability for acts of citizens of the United States
or which affect rights of and impose duties and obligations on
citizens of the United States,
in areas heretofore within the re4
served powers of the states.
This brings me to a consideration of the provisions of our
Federal Constitution with respect to the treaty-making power.
Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 2, of the United States Constitution provides:
He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. * * *
It will be observed that the grant of power is general and
the limitation is only on the manner of its exercise.
5
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation,
decided in
1936, the court held that the treaty-making power is not one
granted by the states; that it does not depend upon an affirmative
grant in the Constitution; that without such a grant it would have
vested in the Federal government as necessary concomitants of
nationality; and that the United States is vested with all the powers of government necessary to maintain an effective control of
international relations.
In United States v. Belmont," decided in 1937, the court said:
The external powers of the United States to be
exercised without regard to state laws or policies.
And in United States v. Pink,7 decided in 1942, the court said:
The field which affects international relations is 'the
one aspect of our government that from the first has been
most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad
national authority.'
Dicta may be found in decisions of the Supreme Court to the
effect that while the treaty-making power is not limited by any
express provision in the Constitution, it does not authorize what
the Constitution forbids and its exercise must not be inconsistent
with the nature of our government and the relation between the
states and the United States. 8 But, to this good day, no treaty has
been judicially declared to be beyond the treaty-making power of
the national government.
May I now direct your attention to Article VI, Paragraph 2,
of the United States Constitution, which provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
3252 U.S. 416, 432, 433.
4

Allen, The Treaty as an Instrument of Legislation, pp. 10, 11.

- 299 U.S.
8 301 U.S.
' 315 U.S.
'Asakura

304, 315-318.
324, 331.
203, 232.
v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 341;

Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211; 243;

Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267.
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which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties, made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.
It will be observed that under this provision, laws of the
United States are the supreme law of the land only if made in
pursuance of the Constitution while treaties are declared to be
the supreme law of the land if they are made under the authority
of the United States.
The last paragraph of Section 8 of Article I of the COnstitution grants to Congress the power to make all laws necessary and
proper for carrying into execution its enumerated powers and
"all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
Under that provision, the Congress may enact laws to implement
and carry into effect a treaty made under the authority of the
United States, although it would not have power under the Constitution to enact such laws in the absence of the treaty. Such
was the holding of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland,"
where the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918,10 and the
regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture in pursuance
thereof came before the Supreme Court. In its opinion the court
referred to two prior cases holding that an earlier act of Congress
which attempted by itself, and not in pursuance of a treaty, to
regulate the killing of migratory birds within the states was invalid, and stated:
Whether the two cases cited were decided rightly or
not they cannot be accepted as a test of the treaty power.
Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only
when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority
of the United States. . . . There may be matters of the
sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act
of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed
by such an act could ...
The validity of the Congressional enactment implementing the
treaty was upheld.
In an address before the American Society of International
Law, on April 26, 1929, the late Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes said:
If we take the Constitution to mean what it says, it
gives in terms to the United States the power to make
treaties. It is a power that has no explicit limitation
attached to it, and so far there has been no disposition
to find in anything relating to the external concerns of
the nation a limitation to be implied.
" Sqpra.
1040

Stat. 755.
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Now there is, however, a new line of activity which
has not been very noticeable in this country, but which
may be in the future, and this may give rise to new questions as to the extent of the treaty-making power.
This is a sovereign nation; from my point of view
the nation has the power to make any agreement whatever in a constitutional manner that relates to the conduct
of our international relations, unless there can be found
some express prohibition in the Constitution, and I am
not aware of any which would in any way detract from
the power as I have defined it in connection with our
relations with other governments. But if we attempted
to use the treaty-making power to deal with matters
which did not pertain to our external relations but to control matters which normally and appropriately were
within the local jurisdictions of the States, then I again
say there might be ground for implying a limitation upon
the treaty-making power that it is intended for the purpose of having treaties made relating to foreign affairs
and not to make laws for the people of the United States
in their internal concerns through the exercise of the
asserted treaty-making power.
But, the present State Department takes a position contrary
to the implied limitation suggested by the late Chief Justice. In
a statement released by the State Department, in September, 1950,
it said:
There is no longer any real distinction between
"domestic" and "foreign" affairs."
The growing tendency to undertake to create a basis for Congressional enactments under the treaty-making power, not within
the Constitutional grant of legislative power in the absence of a
treaty, is indicated by the report of the President's Committee
on Civil Rights, from which I quote:
"The Human Rights Commission of the United Nations at present is working on a detailed international
bill of rights designed to give more specific meaning to
the general principles announced in Article 55 of the
Charter: if this document is accepted by the United
States as a member state, an even stronger base for congressional action under the treaty power may be established." Report of Civil Rights Committee, Par. 10.
If the treaty-making power is not subject to the implied limitation suggested by Chief Justice Hughes, a treaty, in addition to
creating broad power to enact implementing legislation by Congress, may perforce of the treaty itself, if self-executing by its
terms, have the force and effect of a legislative enactment affecting matters of local concern and traditionally regarded as within
the reserved powers of the states. A self-executing treaty, in addi, State Department Publication 3972, Foreign Affairs Policy Series 26.
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tion to being an international contract, becomes municipal, viz.
local, law of the United States in each of the several states and
the judges of each state are bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of their state to the contrary notwithstanding. Only in the United States, and to a limited degree in France,
does a self-executing treaty become municipal law without enabling legislation. Any other nation which enters into a treaty
becomes bound thereby under international law, but the treaty
does not become internal law in such nation, imposing duties or
obligations upon its citizens, unless it is implemented by legislation
enacted in accordance with its constitutional processes.
May I refer briefly to some of the proposed treaties which,
if entered into, will affect individual rights and freedoms of our
citizens or impose civil and criminal liability on individuals.
Today, affiliated agencies of the United Nations have under consideration in excess of 150 proposed treaties dealing with a multitude of subjects, most of which have heretofore been regarded as
within the reserve powers of the states. At least seventeen of
such treaties are in the drafting stage-not by the Secretary of
State, but by such affiliated agencies. Time will not permit a
detailed discussion of many of these treaties. One is the proposed
Convention on Gathering and International Transmission of News
and Right of Correction. Mr. Carroll Binder, a Minneapolis newspaper man, says:
There is no possibility of substantially increasing
freedom of information through the United Nations under
present conditions. On the contrary, there is danger that
encroachment upon freedom of information now practiced by individual sovereign states may obtain legal or
moral sanction through United Nations instruments or
declarations.
Another is the proposed Covenant on Human Rights. Article
2 of that Covenant provides that "in the case of a state of emergency officially proclaimed by the authorities, a state may take
measures derogating from its obligations" to preserve freedom of
speech and of press, and Paragraph 3, Article 14, of that Covenant
provides:
The right to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas carries with it special duties and responsibilities
and may therefore be subject to certain penalties, liabilities, and restrictions, but these shall be such only as are
provided by law and are necessary for the protection of
national security, public order, safety, health or morals,
or of the rights, freedoms or reputations of others.
Like provisions are embraced in the news-gathering convention.
It is obvious that the Oatis case and similar prosecutions
would be legalized under a claim of national defense, national
v. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10;
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 10, 194.
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security, public order, or emergency, and under it the United States
could legalize peacetime censorship. He who writes the orders
for national defense, national security, public order, or national
emergency may control much of the thought of this and other
countries.
In an article published in the January, 1948, issue of the
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,
Mr. John P. Humphrey, a Canadian, and the Director of the Division of Human Rights of the United Nations, said:
What the United Nations is trying to do is revolutionary in character. Human rights are largely a matter
of relationships between the state and individuals, and
therefore a matter which has been traditionally regarded
as being within the domestic jurisdiction of states. What
is now being proposed is, in effect, the creation of some
kind of supernational supervision of this relationship
between the state and its citizens.
The laws of the several states require as a qualification for
admission to the bar United States citizenship. The treaty with
Israel, recently transmitted to the Senate by the President, provides that nationals of either country shall not be barred from
practicing professions in the other country by reason of their
being aliens, if they comply with other requirements, such as residence and competence. Under the most favored nation clause,
included in many treaties to which the United States is a party,
the above provision in the Israel treaty, if it goes into effect, would
be automatically applicable to the nationals of a very large number
of countries. This is a typical example of an invasion of the reserve powers of the states.
Another is the Genocide Convention now before the Senate
for ratification.
I am not unmindful that in the past, acts which this Convention undertakes to define as international crimes have been perpetrated against human groups which shocked the conscience of
mankind, were contrary to moral law, and were abhorrent to all
persons who have a proper and decent regard for the dignity of
human beings, regardless of the national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups to which they belong, and that the end sought to be
attained by this Convention is wholly desirable. But the definitions of Genocide in the Convention are vague and lacking in precision. They do not lay down a certain and understandable rule of
conduct. A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as1 3to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law.
Moreover, the Genocide Convention proposes ultimately to vest
in an international criminial tribunal jurisdiction to try, convict,
and sentence American citizens charged with the offense of Geno"' Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391.
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cide, without the safeguards which our Federal and State Constitutions guarantee to persons charged with domestic crimes.
A separate ad hoc United Nations committee of seventeen
members was created by the General Assembly on December 12,
1950, to prepare a preliminary draft Convention for the establishment of an international criminal court. A draft statute was
completed in August, 1951. It is significant that this statute expressly deprives a defendant of the right to be tried by a jury of
his peers in the district in which the offense is charged to have
been committed-a right we regard as fundamental, and affords
no protection against the use of an involuntary confession as evidence against the accused, a device almost universally resorted to
in the trial of persons accused of crime in the police states. Indeed,
it is asserted in the Report of the Section of International and
Comparative Law to the House of Delegates, Mid-Winter Meeting,
February 25-26, 1952, that a United States citizen, although
charged with an offense committed in the United States, if brought
to trial by an international criminal court for an offense against
international law, would not be entitled to the safeguards guaranteed by our Federal Constitution to persons charged with offenses
against the United States, on the theory that such Constitutional
safeguards have application only to domestic offenses and trials in
our own domestic courts. I vigorously disagree with that concept,
but it shows the extent to which this new notion with respect to
the treaty-making power is being pressed.
What is the answer to our problem? Fbr more than two years
the committee of the American Bar Association on Peace and
Law Through United Nations, a committee on which I have been
privileged to serve since its creation, has engaged in a study of
this problem. At the Mid-Winter Meeting of the American Bar
Association, in 1952, the committee reported to the House of Delegates a proposed Constitutional amendment, which the House
adopted on February 26 last. The amendment reads:
A provision of a treaty which conflicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or
effect. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in
the United States only through legislation by Congress
which it could enact under its delegated powers in the
absence of such treaty.
If adopted, the amendment will prevent a treaty from becoming internal law in the United States by force of its self-executing
terms. It will modify the holding of Missouri v. Holland, supra,
and restrict the power of Congress in enacting legislation to implement a treaty to the legislative powers that it would have in
the absence of such treaty, and will negative the inherent power
theory laid down by the bioad language of United States v. CurtissWright Corporation,supra.
It should be noted particularly that the American Bar Association's proposed amendment does not prevent the President and the
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Senate from making a treaty, otherwise valid under the Constitution, on any subject whatsoever, and renders all such treaties
effective externally. But the proposal prevents such a treaty from
becoming effective as internal law in the United States, except to
the extent that Congress legislates within its delegated powers in
the absence of such treaty.
It has been asserted that the proposed amendment would unreasonably limit the power of the Federal government in the international field. I disagree. Under its power to make war, Congress can conclude peace and it customarily does so by joint resolution. Under its power "to regulate commerce with foreign
nations," Congress can implement treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation-a field which embraces a large portion of
the treaties negotiated between the nations. Congress has the
power "to define and punish piracies and offenses on the high seas
and offenses against the law of nations." Under that power, Congress can implement treaties dealing with such offenses or can
define and provide for the punishment of such offenses without any
antecedent treaty. The foregoing are but illustrations, which could
be multiplied in other fields, such as extradition, judicial assistance,
and the like, and such treaties will become the supreme law of the
land to the extent they are made so by act of Congress legislating
within its delegated powers.
It has been further asserted that the treaty-making power as
it now exists is essential in a dual or Federal-State governmental
system such as ours. That argument, in my opinion, is untenable.
It may be that the proposed amendment would exclude some areas
in which treaties are now made or proposed. But that presents no
insoluble problem, as was pointed out by the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council in Canada v. Ontario (1937) Law Reports,
Appeal Cases, pp. 326, 348, 353-4, wherein it held that when a
treaty embraces provincial classes of subjects, they must be dealt
with by the totality of powers, Dominion and Provincial legislatures
together, in other words, by cooperation between the Dominion and
the several provinces. Here, the same end can be attained by cooperation between the Federal government and the states. Such a
procedure would give due recognition to the reserved powers of the
states.
It is also suggested that the treaties to which I have referred
and other like treaties will not receive approval by the Senate.
I hope that is true. But the lessons of history tell us that unlimited
power in the agents of government is dangerous and liable to be
abused.
It is my firm conviction, after careful and painstaking consideration of the problem, that only by proper restriction of the
treaty-making power, through Constitutional amendment, can we
be sure that the rights of the states and the people and the precious
liberties and fundamental freedoms of the individual citizen will be
safeguarded and preserved.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF COLORADO CASE LAW
The following is a summary of materials presented on October 10, 1952, at the 54th Annual Convention of the Colorado
Bar Association. Subjects have been grouped arbitrarily to best
suit the abilities of the attorneys who conducted the research.
This is the third annual survey of Colorado law to be made by the
Association and was prepared and presented under the direction
of Charles J. Beise of Denver. Only cases which have changed or
added to the law of this state have been considered by the researchers who have given so generously of their time in the preparation of this work. We hope that the material on the following
pages will prove of assistance to Colorado lawyers.

CIVIL REMEDIES AND CIVIL PROCEDURE
CONRAD L. BALL

In Neilson v. Bowles,' an instruction with which the court was
dealing, read:
Such verdict should be on the one out of the four
different theories and claims which a fair preponderance
of the evidence indicates as the true, or most probably true
one.
The Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the jury to determine
as best they can which theory is supported by a preponderance of
the evidence and not which is "probably true."
Kubat v. Kubat :2 The District Court in a divorce action had
stricken from the cross-complaint allegations attacking the validity
of the County Court's adoption decree. Thereafter, in a County
Court action directly attacking said adoption decree, the County
Court sustained a motion to strike similar allegations on the ground
that the matters alleged had been judicially determined in the
District Court action. Held: (1)
All matters relating to the
validity of the adoption had been stricken in the District Court and
therefore were not determined nor adjudicated therein. (2) The
attempted defense of prior adjudication should be set up as a
separate defense under Rule 8 and not by motion.
Risbry v. Swan 3 involved a suit for specific performance of
an alleged contract to make a will and to impress a trust on the
assets of the estate. Parties defendant were the administrator, the
State of Colorado, the mother of deceased, and unknown persons.
All defendants defaulted except the administrator and the state.
On the administrator's objection plaintiff's testimony was stricken
under the provision of sec. 2, ch. 177 '35 Colo. Stat. Ann., commonly referred to as "dead man's statute." Held: An administrator is not an adverse party within this statute where the action is to
determine who is entitled to the assets of the estate since plaintiff
'236 P. 2d 286, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Sept. 24, 1951).
2238 P. 2d 897. 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 26, 1951).
2 239 P. 2d 600, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Dec. 24, 1951).
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was not a "claimant" against the estate; therefore, the statute
could not be invoked by the administrator, hence plaintiff was
qualified to testify. The court stated:
As a by-line and possible guide, we wish to add the
comment that this case presents a quite unusual and rather
unique situation, one which will doubtless infrequently
arise. Great care, therefore, should be had that it be'not
applied other than under an identical factual situation as
here presented.
In Moreno v. Commercial Security Bank,4 it was held that a
petition to intervene may be denied where the petitioner seeks to
change the issues. The only appeal open to the petitioner who was
denied the right to intervene is from the order denying intervention. Such petitioner cannot appeal from the main judgment.
Also, concerning a motion to disqualify the judge, the Court held
that a ruling of the judge in a previous similar case which had been
affirmed on appeal is not evidence of prejudice sufficient for disqualification in a later action.
Rand v. Anderson:- At a pre-trial conference the defendant
was required to furnish plaintiff with a list of expenditures. Thereafter the defendant remembered other items not included in the
list. He attempted to prove such additional items, but was denied
this right by the trial court. Held: This ruling was prejudicial.
Rights of litigants are not to be denied by this kind of a rule of
civil procedure. Pre-trial conferences are designed to expedite liti-'
gation and not to exclude proper and admissable evidence.
In McMullen v. Denver,6 it was held that violation of a quiet
title decree is not civil contempt under Rule 107 (a) unless the
provisions violated are mandatory or prohibitive.
Hoff v. Armbruster,7 was an action to impress a trust on assets
of an estate located in Colorado. The administratrix was personally served. The heirs were served by publication of summons.
Held: Under Rule 4 (g) (2) (h) service by publication could be
made on the non-resident heirs as this was strictly a proceeding
in rem.
In Murrow v. Whiteley," the jury had found defendants liable
in an automobile damage case but failed to follow instructions on
the amount of damages. The trial Court denied plaintiff a new
trial on the issue of damages alone. Held: Under Rule'59 C (a)
where there is no need of another trial on other issues, a new trial
should be granted on the question of damages only. The court
stated that the application of this rule as here presented was one
of first impression.
In PioneerMutual CompensationCompany v. Cosby,9 a damage
'240 P.
1951-2
'242 P.
7242 P.
' 244 P.
9244 P.

2d 118, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Jan. 14, 1952).
C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Jan. 28, 1952).
2d 240, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (March 3, 1952).
2d 604, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (March 24, 1952).
2d 657, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (April 21, 1952).
2d 1089, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 12, 1952).
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suit, the insured defendant brought his insurer into the case by a
third party complaint asking for judgment against the company
for any sum he should be obligated to pay the plaintiff. The defendant recovered judgment against the company for the same
amount as plaintiff's judgment. The Company contended that
defendant had no right to make it a third party defendant because of a "no action" clause in the policy. Held: The purpose of
Rule 14 (a) is to settle as many conflicting interests as possible
in one proceeding. The "no action" clause is directly opposed to
this rule and courts should not permit litigants to circumvent rules
of court by contractural arrangements. The court also held, however, that the policy in this case was one of liability and not indemnity, and did not contain a true "no action" clause.
McCoy v. District Court:10 At a pre-trial conference in an
automobile damage case, the Court ordered the defendant to furnish plaintiffs with copies of statements made by plaintiffs and
given to defendants after the accident and before suit was filed.
The defendants brought original proceeding for writ of prohibition. Held: Under Rule 34, plaintiff does not have an unqualified
right to examine a statement made by him and delivered to the
defendant prior to the suit; he must show good cause. Rule 16,
providing for pre-trial conference, does not confer authority on
the trial court to compel production of documents or force the
making of any admissions. The defendant had no adequate remedy
here by writ of error.
In Reserve Life Insurance Company v. District Court," it was
held that where a party is notified to appear for a deposition, he is
not entitled to subpoena nor to per diem allowance nor mileage
under Rule 5 (b) (1).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ELECTIONS, BANKS
AND BANKING
JOHN R. CLAYTON

Eachus v. People:' Defendant was not a bonded butcher and
sold some beef. He was convicted in District Court and appealed on
constitutional grounds. Our Supreme Court upheld the bonded
butcher statute as being within the police power. Our Court further
quoted with approval the following from a United States Supreme
Court case:
We hold that the police power of a state embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the
general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to
promote the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety.
This case is mentioned to show that the legilature is our first line
10246 P. 2d 619, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (June 23, 1952).
n 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 470 (Aug. 18, 1952).
1238 P. 2d 885, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 19, 1951).
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of defense in the protection of personal liberties. The phrase "the
public convenience or the general prosperity" is most inclusive.
City and County of Denver v. Thrailkill:2 Thrailkill sued the
Manager of Safety and Excise who, acting under a Denver ordinance, refused to transfer master licenses authorizing the operation
of a considerable number of motor vehicles as taxicabs. The renewal of such master licenses was by ordinance placed within the
sound discretion of the licensing authority. Thrailkill contended
the ordinances against sale, transfer and assignment and such
renewability from year to year were unconstitutional. Our Supreme
Court upheld constitutionality stating that such a license was
nothing more or less than the granting of a privilege to enter upon
a business activity, that it was personal to the grantee, and that
the licensing official could be reached by proper proceedings in the
event of an arbitrary abuse of that discretion. Our Court further
stated that such a master license was a mere personal privilege
and not property in a constitutional sense. Thus no vested right
was acquired when it was originally obtained.
Anderson v. Town of Westminster:3 Plaintiff complained
against the formation of an improvement district contending that
the statutes outlining formation of such a district were unconstitutional as violating due process of law because no Court hearing
was provided for prior to organization of the district. The statute
in question provided for a hearing before the town trustees rather
than a judicial hearing. Our Supreme Court, in upholding the
constitutionality, stated:
We believe a hearing before the governing body of
the town before the passage of any ordinance and, in the
event of a subsequent ordinance creating the district, the
right of judicial review of its validity, preserves due process.
Sullivan v. Siegal:4 Section of act repealing prior act limiting
interest on any loan, and other conflicting acts, was invalid and
unconstitutional with respect to loans over $300 as not within title
stating that act relates to loans of $300 or less, and hence prior
act was repealed as respecting loans less than $300, but not as to
loans of over $300. It is commented on primarily to direct attention of practicing lawyers to the danger of relying upon the present
Colorado Statutes Annotated as law. The practicing attorney can
rely only on the Session Laws.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer: 5 The question involved was whether the seizure order of the steel mills was
within the constitutional power of the President. Justice Black
delivered the opinion. In holding that the seizure order went beyond the constitutional power of the executive, the opinion pointed
out that the President had not relied upon any statutory authori'244
1244
'245
5343

P. 2d 1074, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 19, 1952).
P. 2d 371. 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (April 21, 1952).
P. 2d 860. 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 12, 1952).
U.S. 579 (1952).
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zation, but had claimed authority "vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President of the United
States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces". On the
theory of "inherent executive authority" to avert national disaster,
the Court rules that the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed "limits his functions in the lawmaking process
to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of
laws he thinks bad". The legislative power was clearly reserved
to Congress by the first clause of Article I of the Constitution, it
was declared. (In conjunction with this holding, the speech of
Chancellor Albert C. Jacobs, 10 Judicial Circuit on July 18, 1952,
entitled "The Function of the Courts in Maintaining Constitutional
Government and Individual Freedom" is recommended).
ELECTIONS

Martin et al v. Boyle :6 Under statute providing for organization of fire protection districts, and providing that election for
incorporation of territory into districts shall be held and conducted
as nearly as may be in same manner as general elections in state,
that official register lists of elections may be used for determining
voter's qualifications, if a person's name is on latest official registration list his qualifications as voter at general election are established and if he is a taxpayer other than by payment of automobile
taxes he is entitled to vote and if he established all of those qualifications and his name is not on official registration list he may
establish his qualifications by affidavit. Laws 1947, ch. 238, sec. 1
et seq., 8; Const. art. 7, sec. 11. The statute, sec. 8, ch. 238,
Session Laws of 1947, provided that "such elections shall be held
and conducted as nearly as may be in the same manner as general
elections in this state". Our Court held that the legislature made
an unequivocal allowance for conditions not controlled by the general election laws. Thus, in a special election under this particular
statute, qualifications may be established by affidavit. Compare this
case to City of Montrose v. Niles,7 where our Supreme Court, in
a water and sewage bond election, reiterated the general principle
that the requirements of the law on the qualifications of electors
are mandatory, and must be strictly observed. In the Montrose
case our Supreme Court held that an owner of an automobile, who
had paid the specific ownership tax thereon, a person who owns
property which is assessed in the name of another, and a purchaser
of realty under a contract of sale are not "taxpaying electors" and
are not qualified to vote in a municipal bond election.
BANKS AND BANKING

First National Bank of Denver v. Jones :8 Plaintiff purchased
an automobile from one defendant and financed the purchase thru
the bank. Plaintiff instructed the manager of the installment loan
' 237 P. 2d 110, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Sept. 24, 1951).
7238 P. 2d 875, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Oct. 3, 1951).
8 237 P. 2d 1082, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 19, 1951).
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department of the bank to investigate the title and to determine
whether the car was good security. The bank's officer asked the
defendant seller if the title were clear. The seller said it was.
Thereupon plaintiff signed the note and chattel mortgage. The car
in fact was mortgaged and plaintiff had to pay off said mortgage.
She sued defendant seller and joined defendant bank. Upon trial
judgment entered against both defendants, the bank appealed.
This case was reversed as to the bank only, primarily on the
grounds of insufficient pleading to show employment of bank to
examine title in plaintiff's behalf. The Court held that the instruction for such an examination was outside of the employee's duty
in behalf of the bank and, in performing such examination, the
employee became agent of the plaintiff. Any liability resulting from
negligence would be the personal liability of the employee and not
of the bank.

CONTRACTS, AGENCY, SALES AND CORPORATIONS
HARRY A. KING

With exception of the few cases which are hereinafter discussed, the bulk of the decisions by the Supreme Court in the last
year on the questions of contracts, agencies and partnerships, personal property, sales and corporations present examples of the
application of familiar rules of law in differing factual situations.
An interesting case presenting and determining questions of
procedure in administration of estates and primarily involving the
reformation of a contract is that of Holter v. Cozad, 238 P. 2d 190.
The question presented for determination by the Court was whether
or not a contract for the purchase and sale of real property entered
into by a decedent during his lifetime, as the seller, and another, as
the purchaser, might be reformed and specifically performed in the
proceeding to administer the estate of the deceased. The petition to
the County Court for this relief was denied. On an appeal to the
District Court the relief prayed for was granted. On a writ of
error to the Supreme Court it was held that because of the indefiniteness of the description of the property, which was the subject of the contract, that before a specific performance could be
decreed the contract must first be reformed to set forth the real
agreement of the parties. This the County Court was without
jurisdiction to do in the estate proceeding. On the appeal from the
decision of the County Court, the District Court's jurisdiction was
derivative and limited for the purpose of the appeal to the matters
and things which might have been adjudged and determined by
the County Court in the first instance. It was, therefore, without
jurisdiction to grant the relief awarded in the decree. It was said
that the relief prayed for in the petition filed in the County Court
should have been sought in a separate proceeding filed in the District Court wherein the contract might have been reformed and
specific performance ordered in the one action.
The cases of Oriental Refining Co. v. Hallenbeck, 240 P. 2d
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913 and Light v. Rogers, 242 P. 2d 234 are interesting and informative for the recognition and application of the parol evidence rule.
In each of the cases, the Court held that parol evidence was inadmissable to alter the terms of a contract which on its face was
definite and certain.
The case of Wright v. Nelson, 242 P. 2d 243, involved
what was contended to have been a conveyance to delay, hinder and defraud creditors. The case is considerably important
for the complete discussion of fraudulent conveyances and the elements thereof which appear in the decision. In reversing the
judgment of the District Court, the Court held that the plaintiff
had failed to sustain by a preponderance of the evidence the burden
of overcoming the usual presumption of validity which attends all
sales, and went on to hold that to justify setting aside a conveyance
to hinder and delay a creditor it must appear that the hindering
and delaying was intended to be produced by the grantor through
covin, malice or for the grantor's benefit and advantage, and in
addition it must also appear that the grantee participated in or
had knowledge of the grantor's intent. A secret intent entertained
by a grantor to defraud creditors of which the grantee is ignorant
does not taint the transfer with invalidity. The transfer there attacked was not one which fell within the statute which places on
the parties thereto the burden of proving the bona fide of a transaction. It was further held in that case that for purposes of the
three year statute of limitation that a party is charged with knowledge of a fraudulent transfer as of the date when he became possessed of the means to detect the fraud and that possession of the
means of detecting a fraud is equivalent to knowledge of the fraud.
Weinchel v. Adamic, 242 P. 2d' 219, presents another in the
increasing list of cases wherein our Court has held that exemplary
damages may not be awarded under the provisions of our statute,
where the action sounds in contract. In this case the jury was instructed on the issue of exemplary damage and returned a verdict
therefor in favor of the plaintiff. The facts were that Weinchel,
who had agreed to purchase cattle from Adamic, agreed to pay for
the animals on the basis of their weight after they had gone without food and water for twelve hours. The cattle were weighed and
paid for and taken by the purchaser who thereafter stopped payment on the check which he had given the seller, justifying his actions on the contention that the cattle, during the twelve hour
period preceding the determination of their weight, had been fed
and watered, contrary to the contract. The Court was of the opinion
that there was little or no evidence in the case from which the jury
might conclude that the seller had breached his contract in this
regard; and appeared inclined to accept the seller's verision of the
case that payment of the check was stopped by the purchaser for
the purpose of negotiating and procuring a more favorable price.
The Court's views on the evidence adduced at the trial are significant in indicating its attitude on the question of awarding exemplary damages in cases sounding in contract. As viewed by the

Nov., 1952

DICTA

Court, the facts were not closely disputed, and certainly the case
presented aggravated circumstances wherein, if exemplary damages are ever to be awarded for breach of a contract, they might
well here have been allowed.
The case of Greenwood v. Kier, 234 P. 2d 417, is important for
the able discussion and review of the authorities which appears in
the opinion on the question of the family car doctrine, concededly
predicated on an agency. The doctrine, the Court points out, is of
comparatively recent origin and has enjoyed rapid growth and extension. One of the questions presented was whether or not the
doctrine would be extended to include a case where, from the facts,
it appeared that the title to the vehicle claimed to have been a
family car was in the name of a corporation; that the vehicle was
used primarily in the conduct of the corporate business; and that
the principal officer of the corporation and the one who directed
its activities was the wife of the man to whom the vehicle had been
loaned for the purpose of a hunting expedition, in which the corporation had no interest. Generally speaking, the family car doctrine has been limited to cases in which the car was kept and maintained by the head of a family for the general use, pleasure and convenience of members of the family. While the Court does not specifically hold that the owner of the car or the one who has the primary
control of its use must necessarily be the head of a family to constitute the vehicle a family car, it does nevertheless observe that the
efforts of the plaintiff to establish this fact failed, and further notes
that evidence to the effect that the husband was not employed at
the time of the accident creates no presumption that he was not the
head of a family and discharging his obligations as such. Cases are
cited in which it appeared that the title to a vehicle was vested in
a corporation which was under the control of a person who was
also the head of a family who also had the exclusive custody, control
and use of the car, which was used as a family car, wherein it
has been held that notwithstanding that the title was in the corporation the vehicle was a family car. In each of the cases relied upon
by the Court, however, the car was either owned by the head of a
family or its use as a family car was made available by the head
of the family. Whether one who is not the head of a family who
maintains an automobile for use by members of the family would be
liable under the family car doctrine is not decided; yet language
appears in the opinion which would indicate that this is a rule
which the Court might be somewhat reluctant to adopt.
In the same action the plaintiff sought to recover damages from
the corporation which owned the vehicle involved in the accident
on the theory that at the time it was loaned to the driver thereof
he was intoxicated, a fact which was well known to the officers of
the corporation who made the bailment. The Court recognized the
general rule that a bailor is not liable for the negligent acts of his
bailee. In its charge to the jury on this aspect of this case, the trial
court instructed in effect that unless the jury found that at the time
of the bailment the officers of the corporation knew that the bailee
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was intoxicated and that in his intoxicated condition he intended
to operate the vehicle on the highways, that they should find for
the defendant corporation. This the Supreme Court held to be a
correct statement of the law. It may well be questioned if the trial
court's charge to the jury was broad enough or sufficiently detailed to present for the jury's determination the issue of the
bailor's liability predicated on the doctrine that one who bails a
dangerous instrumentality to a bailee who, because of his incompetence, should not have been entrusted with the use of the thing
bailed, will be answerable for the damages sustained by third persons as a consequence of the bailment. Here, of course, the bailor's
liability is predicated on his own negligence and not on that of the
bailee which might be imputed to him because of the relationship
of the parties arising from the contract of bailment.
A novel case and one of considerable interest is that of Panhandle Co. v. Pressey & Son, 243 P 2d 756, with the discussion of
which I shall conclude this article. There the Panhandle Company,
who dealt in second hand iron, contracted to sell Oliver some used
well casing at an agreed price to be paid upon delivery of the pipe
in Boise City, Oklahoma. The pipe was taken on one of the employer's trucks by an employee, French, to Boise City where he met
Oliver who had a truck and driver available for the transfer thereof.
The pipe was unloaded from the Panhandle Company's truck and
delivered to Oliver who affixed his signature to the original of the
sales ticket which had been made covering the transaction. French,
the seller's agent, demanded payment in full for the pipe, but
Oliver explained that he had left at such an early hour that he had
been unable to procure a cashier's check from the bank to make
the payment and assured French that he would on the following
day mail a check therefor to the Panhandle Company. French advised Oliver that he was without authority to deliver the pipe except
that he receive payment and before permitting Oliver to depart
with the pipe he would have to procure authority therefor from his
employer, which he attempted to do. French was unable to reach
his principal by telephone and upon returning to the place where
the pipe had been delivered could find neither Oliver, Oliver's truck,
nor the pipe. Subsequently, the Panhandle Company learned that
Oliver had left Boise City and had proceeded to Pressey's place of
business in Colorado and had there sold the pipe. The case involved
an action in replevin by the Panhandle Company against Pressey,
the purchaser of the pipe from Oliver, for the recovery thereof.
The judgment of the trial court which was against the Panhandle Company was reversed on the theory that under the terms
of a contract, such as the one made between plaintiff and Oliver,
which was for the sale of personal property for cash, the title to
the property purchased does not pass to the purchaser unless the
payment is received upon the delivery or is specifically waived by
the seller. One who purchases property and pays a valuable consideration therefor to a seller who in turn has acquired no title
because of his failure to pay the purchase price upon which the
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sale was conditioned acquires no right in the property which is valid
as against the claims of the initial seller. There are exceptions to
the rule which the Court recognized where some muniment of title
is by the initial seller placed in the hands of the purchaser on which
a subsequent purchaser relies. In such a case the rule that where
one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss arising from the
culpability of a third person, he whose carelessness or negligence
made the loss possible must bear the loss.
This completes a review of the more important and novel
cases decided in the past year on the subjects assigned. Needless
to say, all of the adjudicated cases are of importance. Only those
in which novel or interesting questions have appeared have been
noted and the omission of any one case from this discussion should
not be regarded as a conclusion of the writer that the omitted case is
wanting in importance, but rather that the issues of law presented,
discussed and applied do not present the novelty which would make
them of interest in this type of paper.

CRIMINAL LAW
M. E. H. SMITH

The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled on approximately
twenty cases in the field of criminal law during the past year. The
majority of these cases have been the usual run of the mill raising
no new points or issues for consideration by our Court. However,
there are eight which deserve comment at this time.
I should like to call your attention to the case of People v.
Dolph.' You will recall that this case had considerable publicity,
and involved one of the councilmen of the City of Denver. Councilman Dolph was allegedly trafficking in the sale of a liquor license.
He was apprehended and arrested when he received $500 in the
basement of a drug store. As a result, he was charged with confidence game and attempting to obtain money by false pretenses.
The confidence game was disposed of under a common principle and
is not noteworthy in the case. The trial court ruled that there is no
crime of attempting to obtain money by false pretenses and dismissed the case. The state appealed and the Supreme Court held
that while the facts showed violations of all concepts of ethics and
decency, still, in the State of Colorado there is no crime of attempted false pretenses since there is no specific statute enacting
it and there was no crime such as this known to the common law
as of 1607.
Both Block v People,2 and Kallnback v. People,3 were cases of
causing death of a person while operating an automobile under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. In the Block case the question was
raised concerning the obtaining of a sample of blood for an alcohol
test while the defendant was unconscious. In the Kallnback case
'239 P. 2d 312, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Dec. 17, 1951).
- 240 P. 2d 512, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 19, 1951).
1242 P. 2d 222, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Feb. 4, 1952).
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a sample of blood was obtained from the defendant for an alcohol
test without the defendant's objection. In both cases it was contended that this was a violation of the defendant's constitutional
privileges against self incrimination under Article 2, Section 18 of
the Colorado Constitution.
While these identical questions had not been raised in Colorado before, as far as our Supreme Court is concerned, the general
rule throughout the United States has been that such a test was not
the defendant's testimony, nor was the test obtained with the use
of any process against him as a witness and the test was proven
as was any other physical fact in the case. Hence, the defendant
was in no way speaking against himself. A few courts have confused the test as testimony. Our Court clearly made the distinction that the constitutional privilege was intended to prevent a
defendant from being forced to give testimony against himself. Our
Court did not contemplate the exclusions of evidence of physical
facts relating to the defendant, and that the result of an analysis of
a blood sample was not his testimony. This principle is again reaffirmed by citing the Block case in the Kallnback case.
In Rosier v. People,4 the defense sought by subpoena duces
tecum to obtain all the files concerning the defendant from the
Police Department and the District Attorney. In this case the
defense relied upon Battalino v. People,5 wherein the defendant
had demanded written statements of certain witnesses. The Court
now adopts a statement directly out of Wharton's Criminal Evidence and underlines the same to the effect that, "as to the evidence
in possession of the prosecution, the general rule is that the accused
has no right to inspection or disclosures of the same." The Court
further quotes from the Battalino case and states that the, "granting or refusal of the accused's request for inspection of written
statements of a witness for the prosecution has been held to lie in
the discretion of the trial court." The Court also quotes from Silliman v. People,G to the effect that:
A written confession of the defendant in a criminal
case may be retained by the prosecution officers until such
time as they desire to make use of it. No right of defendant is violated when his motion to inspect the document before it is offered in evidence is denied, that right
being accorded him when it is formally offered.
The Court further states:
In this jurisdiction there is neither statute nor precedent authorizing defendant's counsel to make an examination or inspection of the People's evidence prior to the
time that it is offered on the trial. Under some most unusual circumstances defendant may be entitled to inspect
and examine documents in the possession of the law en1247 P. 2d 448, C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (July 14, 1952).
1118 Colo. 587 (1948).
'114 Colo. 130 (1945).
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forcing officers, but then he first must make a prima facie
showing of their materiality.
This question has been before the Supreme Court at a later date
with apparently a similar ruling in the case of Cassinetti v. District Court of El Paso County, No. 16,762, on which the opinion is
not yet available.
In the case of Tate v. People,7 which involved a charge of murder, the Court quoted from Ryan v. People,8 which had set up the
rule that if there was an error in the instructions in first degree
murder and the jury returned a verdict of second degree murder,
the error was harmless and not grounds for reversal, but in view
of the case of Battalino v. People,9 holding that the trial court
should not instruct on a degree of homicide not sustained by the
evidence, the Court now stated in the Tate case:
We are now inclined to re-evaluate the statement in
Ryan v. People, 50 Colo. 99, 144 Pac. 306, that it was not
prejudicial error to instruct on first degree murder when
the verdict returned was a second degree. When this court
holds in a majority of cases that a trial court should not
instruct on degrees of homicide not sustained by the evidence, then in this case, we must say that by such an instruction here, error obtains. The fact that the trial court
gave an instruction on first degree murder when the essential elements are missing in the proof, it must be said that
the jury could easily infer by the giving of such an instruction that these elements were present in the case. It presents a fertile field for discussion among jurors not skilled
in legal technique, for finding a welcome opportunity to
compose differences and agree upon a compromise verdict. We must say that it was prejudicial error under the
circumstances of this case to give the instruction on first
degree murder in the absence of proof of the necessary
elements.
In the case of Eckhardt v. People,10 the court again quoted
from the Tate case and cited most of the above as the law. This
case, incidentally, held that a manslaughter charge and an assault
and battery charge while based on the same facts are not two
degrees of the same crime, but initiate crimes of different classes
and cannot be combined.
In Walker v. People," a murder case, the principle is again
affirmed as set out in Ryan v. People,"-' by stating:
This likewise is true where the error relates to first
degree murder and defendant is convicted of murder of
the second degree as we specifically held in Ryan v. People,
50 Colo. 99, 106, 114 Pac. 306. The contention that the
247 P. 2d 682, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 5, 1952).
50 Colo. 99 (1911).
118 Colo. 587 (1948).
,247 P. 2d 673, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (June 23, 1952).
'1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (July 24, 1952).
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objectionable parts of the instructions may have influenced the jury to compromise their verdict 'rests upon
conjecture, merely, and cannot be entertained. We must
assume that the jury performed their duty intelligently,
and with a correct understanding of the charge of the
court.'
In reading the case we find that at one point the Court does comment that a verdict of murder in the first degree would have been
fully supported by the record so that there apparently were elements to justify the first degree murder charge, where the Tate
case did not have the elements to justify such a charge.
From the reading of these cases together, it would appear that
we now have a new and modified rule. If all the elements are present in the case justifying a first degree murder charge, regardless
of the fact that there may be an error in the first degree instructions and a second degree murder verdict results, such error is
harmless. On the other hand, if any elements of the first degree murder charge are lacking such instruction would be reversible error.
In McBride v. People, the Supreme Court extended the facts
of confidence game as basically shown in Munsell v. People,13 to
cover a series of checks given by the defendant wherein he knows
that the checks are short and held that it was a part of a scheme
to defraud, thus making the checks bogus, and coming within the
confidence game statute. The Court held further that the intent of
the defendant rather than the means used in obtaining the money is
the primary issue of the offense.

EQUITY, WATER, OIL AND GAS
FRANK F. DOLAN
EQUITY

Rand v. Anderson:' The plaintiff, mother of the defendant,
filed the action to rescind an alleged oral agreement whereby he had
agreed to support and maintain her for the remainder of her life,
and to set aside a deed of conveyance in joint tenancy to her son
and herself. The defendant, among other defenses, denied the existence of the alleged oral agreement and alleged the execution of
conveyance in joint tenancy to have been a voluntary gift on the
part of the plaintiff and the expenditure of large sums by him in
improving the property, and prayed for partition of the premises,
or, in the alternative, if decree of rescission be granted, then that
plaintiff be required to reimburse him for the monies he advanced
and disbursed in reliance on his interest according to the deed.
The lower court found generally for the plaintiff, however, it entered judgment for the defendant against the plaintiff for the
monies paid out by him for improving the property less an amount
charged against him for use and occupancy of a room occupied by
him and his wife until the time they had removed from the prop" 122 Colo. 420, 222 P. 2d 615 (1950).
11951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Jan. 28, 1952).
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erty on account of a disagreement between plaintiff and defendant,
and gave the defendant a lien against the property for his judgment but ordered that defendant could take no steps to recover on
it during the lifetime of the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court did not view either the pleadings or the
evidence in the light of the trial Court and reversed the trial Court,
holding, among other things: that plaintiff had burden of establishing the contract by definite and clear evidence, and, further, that
when evidence relied upon is adduced for the purpose of cancellation of an instrument (in this case the deed in joint tenancy) it
must be beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plaintiff's evidence did not meet the test; and that any judgment for defendant
should have been one open to the present benefit of the defendant
without the above mentioned restrictions for its collection placed
thereon. The Supreme Court in reversing the trial Court, directed
the trial Court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and vacate defendant's judgment, all without prejudice to the parties starting a new
action.
On September 22, 1952, on rehearing, 2 the Supreme Court
ordered that the opinion heretofore announced and above stated
be withdrawn, the judgment reversed, and the cause remanded with
directions for a new trial. The opinion on such rehearing continued
the Court's position that the plaintiff had to establish her allegea
agreement or contract, as well as its breach, not only by evidence
that is definite and clear, but that it must be beyond reasonable
doubt, and further that any judgment awarded the defendant
should be immediately effective.
Fastenau v. Engel:3 In April, 1948 plaintiff brought suit to
quiet title to land held by defendant under treasurer's deed issued
in September, 1943. Separate defenses of defendant were that
plaintiff's predecessors in title had abandoned the premises, failed
to pay taxes thereon, and that plaintiff was "barred by laches from
seeking relief in a court of equity." The Supreme Court held: that
no statute of limitations barred plaintiff's action; that failure to
pay taxes was not an abandonment of the property, nor did it constitute laches, and this, even though the land had been enhanced in
value; and that courts will not invoke equitable defenses to destroy
legal rights where statutes of limitation are applicable.
Stubbs v. Standard Life Ass'n. : 4 Action for reformation of
Mortgage Deed, the foreclosure proceedings thereof, and the Sheriff's Deed, to include as part of the property 290 acres that had been
omitted from the description through inadvertence. After issuance
of Sheriff's Deed the purchaser, holder of mortgage, went into possession of omitted acreage and continued in possession for period
of more than ten years before there was any knowledge of the omission, and sixteen years before bringing action-paying taxes during all of such time. No third parties or adverse rights had inter,1952-3 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 11 (Sept. 27, 1952).
' 240 P. 2d 1173, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 183 (Feb. 9, 1952).
" 242 P. 2d 819, 1951-2 C. B. A. Ady. Sh. 247 (March 22, 1952).
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vened. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial Court
awarding the plaintiff the relief prayed, and stated that the action
was properly maintainable under Rule 105, Rules of Civil Procedure.
Kerns v. Bank of Manitou :- Action instituted June 18, 1948
by purchaser for recission of contract to purchase real property on
basis of mutual mistake as to what tract was intended to be sold
and purchased. Tract conveyed by seller to purchaser by Quit
Claim Deed in September, 1946. In March, 1948 a survey disclosed
that tract conveyed was not the one intended to be sold and purchased, and in April, 1948 purchaser notified seller that he elected
to rescind the contract and demanded return of consideration paid.
Between May 19, 1948 and August 10, 1948 purchaser negotiated
with third party for sale of tract (evidently the one that had been
conveyed), such third party being advised of this litigation and
that such proposed sale would have to be made with reference
thereto. Purchaser also paid the 1947 general taxes on August 3,
1948. The trial Court held that the purchaser by his acts had ratified the Contract, and dismissed plaintiff's Complaint. The Supreme
Court reversed the trial Court, holding: that mistake as to what
tract was to be sold and purchased was a mutual mistake; that
plaintiff's conduct after he brought the suit was not an assertion
of ownership, he having specifically represented to prospective
buyer that the rescission suit was pending and that a sale could
not be consummated without consideration thereof, and the proposed sale price was for the identical price he paid his seller; and
that it was plaintiff's duty to protect the land from tax sale so that
he would be in a position to reconvey the title to defendant should
his suit be successful and he be so ordered by the Court.
Smith v. Haertel:O Action to obtain a judgment decreeing
plaintiffs to be the owners of certain real property, free and clear
of any right, title or interest of the defendants, awarding plaintiffs
possession thereof, and for an accounting for rents and profits.
Defendants defended on basis that a Deed previously executed by
them was a mortgage. Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of
the lower Court in favor of the plaintiff stated: that for the purpose
of this case a mortgage may be defined as a conveyance of an estate
or interest in land by way of pledge as security for payment of a
debt, it becomes void upon payment in order to constitute a valid
mortgage, it is not necessary that the instrument itself should
contain a description of the debt, payment of which is intended
to be secured, nor is it essential that there be a note or other obligation separate from the mortgage itself evidencing the indebtedness. However, it is necessary that there be a debt to be discharged,
such indebtedness must be recited in the mortgage, and the nature
and amount of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage must be
so expressed that subsequent purchasers and attaching creditors
need not look beyond the mortgage itself to ascertain both the exA242 P. 2d 817, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 263 (March 29, 1952).
'244 P. 2d 377, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 285 (April 12, 1952).
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istence and amount of the debt. It also must appear from the instrument, or the circumstances present at the time of the transaction,
that the intention was that the property was to be held as security,
and further, the intent to create an equitable mortgage must be
clearly evidenced so that a prospective purchaser may be apprised
of the fact that the transactions between the parties to the instrument have not been fully completed and all obligations thereunder
fully discharged.
WATER

The Brighton Ditch Co., et al. v. City of Engle wood: 7 Action
instituted by City of Englewood to change point of diversion some
sixteen miles down stream of water rights acquired by it in connection with its purchase of ranch property, with change of use of
the water from irrigation to domestic and municipal purposes.
The trial Court granted the change sought by plaintiff subject to
limitations and conditions imposed to protect the rights of other
appropriators, such limitations and conditions being so numerous
and technical in their nature that it is impossible for me to set
them forth. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the trial
Court on all points, thereby adhering to well defined rules concerning protection of the water rights of others when a change is
granted, and holding that the evidence overwhelmingly justified the
finding of the trial Court that no vested rights would be injured by
the change.
City and County of Denver v. Noble :S Action against City for
alleged damages caused by it in construction and widening West
Alameda Avenue whereby plaintiff's irrigation ditch was damaged
and destroyed. Plaintiff recovered judgment against City for $9,000
in trial Court. Supreme Court reversed judgment on basis of incorrect and incomplete instructions given jury concerning the measure
of damages, giving its opinion as to proper measure under varying
circumstances.
The City of Colorado Springs v. Yust :" The City petitioned for
change of point of diversion of certain water rights from several
tributaries of the Blue River, decreed to the East Hoosier and West
Hoosier Ditches, alleging that such change would not injuriously
affect the vested rights of other appropriators. The defendants filed
protests, and after hearing the trial Court found that plaintiff had
failed to establish the fact that the proposed transfer and change
of point of diversion would not injuriously affect the vested rights
of others, and therefore denied the petition. The Supreme Court,
after reviewing the greater part of the evidence and the law pertaining to such matters as previously laid down by the Supreme
Court to the effect that a water owner has an inherent right to
change the point of diversion without conditions, but with conditions if such change can be made without substantial injury to the
- 237 P. 2d 116, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 32 (Oct. 13, 1951).
6237 P. 2d 637, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 44 (Oct..22, 1951).
01952-3 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 10 (Sept. 27, 1952).
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vested rights of others, reversed the judgment of the trial Court
and remanded the case with directions to the trial Court to determine, upon the evidence already taken, together with any additional
evidence the parties may see fit to introduce, whether the change
of the point of diversion as prayed would injuriously affect the
vested rights of protestants, and, if so, whether such effect may be
prevented by the imposition of terms and conditions, and to enter
the Decree accordingly. The Supreme Court also stated that the
burden of proof on the petitioner in such a proceeding requires
him to meet only the grounds of injury to protestants asserted by
them, and that the evidence presented by the petitioner constituted
prima facie evidence to satisfy the burden of proof resting on the
petitioner.
OIL AND GAS

The only cases having to do with Oil and Gas are the cases
11
of Mitchell v. Espinosa 'o and Johnson v. McLaughlin,
and cover
the manner of creating mineral reservations and the effect thereof, and I believe have been reported upon by Mr. Rubright.
DAMAGES FOR SUBSIDENCE ACCOUNT REMOVAL OF COAL

Colorado Fuel and Iron Corporationv. Salardino:12 Action for
alleged damages to plaintiff's land and buildings caused by the
removal by the defendant, who owned the same, of coal deposits
underlying plaintiff's land and adjacent land in a careless, wrongful
and negligent manner. Defendant alleged that plaintiff's improvements were placed upon the surface property with full knowledge
of defendant's right to mine and remove the coal adjacent to or
underlying the same, and by so doing plaintiff assumed the risk
of damage to his property. Plaintiff recovered judgment in the
trial Court. The Supreme Court, in reversing the case, and ordering a new trial, held that a mine operator must leave support sufficient to maintain the surface in its natural state, but that negligence
on the part of the mine operator must be proved to recover for
damages to buildings erected upon the surface of the land.

REAL PROPERTY AND PROBATE
ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT

Mitchell v. Espinosa I is significant. A grantor reserved mineral rights in a deed. The mineral interest and the surface interest
were not thereafter separately assessed, but continued to be assessed as a unit. A later Treasurer's Deed for unpaid taxes subsequent to the severance was held not to convey a tax title to the
mineral interest. This case was commented upon in DICTA. 2 The
case also caused the Real Estate Title Standards Committee to pubP. 2d 412, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 243 (March 22, 1952).
243 P. 2d 812, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 259 (March 22, 1952).
12 245 P. 2d 461, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 367 (June 7, 1952).
'243 P. 2d 412, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 243 (March 17, 1952).
"29 DICTA 225 (June, 1952).
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lish a special note to Real Estate Title Standard No. 47.3 The effect of this note is that Title Standard No. 47 may not be applicable to a mineral estate which was severed prior to the tax
sale upon which the Treasurer's Deed was based. Another significant point determined in this case was that a tax deed is not void
even though executed and issued later than the date fixed in the
notice for the issuance of the Treasurer's Deed. The court overruled the former case of Tewell v. Galbraith.4 Attention is called
to the provisions of the 1951 Session Laws, Chap. 258, p. 726 which
permits a delay in the acknowledgment of the Treasurer's Deed and
which liberalizes the form by not requiring a statement when the
redemption period expires. The statute requires that the Treasurer's Deed shall be signed within five months from service of the
notice.
Hoff v. Armbruster 5 is a case where husband and wife executed identical wills at the same time. The husband died first and
his will was still in existence, although it was not probated. The
wife died later and the will was not found. Her estate was being administered as an intestate estate and a legatee under her will contended that the wills were mutual, reciprocal and irrevocable. The
plaintiffs were the beneficiaries under the will, and sought to impose a trust upon the assets of the decedent which otherwise would
have passed to her heirs-at-law under the intestacy statutes. The
court upheld the position of the beneficiaries under the will and
held that wills executed under circumstances existing in this case
were mutual, reciprocal and irrevocable. There was no express
agreement that the wills were irrevocable but the court found an
implied agreement to that effect. Because of the common practice
of drawing identical wills in order to provide against a common
disaster, this case indicates that extra precautions should be taken
to prescribe the conditions under which the survivor could change
the testamentary plan used in his own will. Some lawyers have
even suggested that in order to avoid an implied contract, which
the court found here, it would be well to have a contract in writing
prescribing exactly under what conditions the survivor could modify his will.
Gehm v. Brown 1 contains a caution to attorneys who have
been trusted friends or advisors of the testator and to whom the
testator is making a bequest. The case held that a presumption of
undue influence is raised where a real estate agent drew a will in
which he was made a beneficiary and the executor. It would appear
that many lawyers, because of close and confidential relationship
with clients might be caught in the same trap and the case indicates
that extreme care should be used by an attorney drawing a will
under those circumstances where he takes any interest under it.
For years lawyers have wondered whether or not a widow, in
'29 DICTA 331 (Sept, 1952).
4119 Colo. 412, 205 P. 2d 229 (1949).
'242 P. 2d 604, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Feb. 11, 1952).
6 245 P. 2d 865, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (June 2, 1952).
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addition to her statutory widow's allowance of $2000, might be
allowed a homestead exemption on real estate which was occupied7
by her as a home. The case of Wallace v. First National Bank,
decides that a widow may have both a widow's allowance and a
homestead exemption. The court also held that the widow could
occupy the home under her homestead during the period of administration. Attention is called to 1951 Session Laws, ch. 214, p. 522,
where the exemption is raised from $2,000 to $5,000.
Although the court, in Mitchell v. Espinosa supra, and in the
case of Johnson v. McLaughlin,8 evidenced a continuation of a
reasonable interpretation of the validity of tax deeds, Siler v. Investment Securities Co." indicates that a Treasurer's Deed may be
attacked where the Treasurer did not send notices to the proper
address of the fee title owner even though there was a current address in his office to which tax notices on other property had been
sent.
In Rochester v. Richards,0 the court discusses at some length
whether the word "and" or the word "or" will be supplied in place
of a comma between the name of the legatee and the following words
which were descriptive of the interest the legatee took. The case
would seem to indicate that a comma should never be used where
words of limitation are intended as in the following phrase: "to
Joe Doakes, his heirs and assigns," but rather the phrase should
read: Joe Doakes and his heirs and assigns." Likewise, if a substitution is intended, the phrase should substitute the word "or" instead of a comma-"to Joe Doakes or his heirs or assigns."

SURETYSHIP, INSURANCE AND TORTS
LOUIS G. ISAACSON
SURETYSHIP
Our Court has considered three cases on this subject, two of
them, Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. Central Finance I and Mass.
Bonding Co. v. Bank of Aurora,2 involving the relatively new motor
vehicle bonds. In the first of these cases, the attorneys who had entered an appearance for both the bonding company and the defaulting dealer permitted a judgment by default to be entered
against the dealer, and thereafter attempted to defend as to the
bonding company by showing that there was no evidence of fraud.
The Court held that the default judgment against the dealer resulted in an automatic judgment against the bonding company, being conclusive proof of the fraud necessary to recover on the bond.
In the second case, where the fraudulent transactions occurred
prior to the effective date of the bond but renewal notes and chattel
mortgages were taken thereafter, the Court denied recovery, hold246 P. 2d 894, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (June 16, 1952).

'242 P. 2d 812, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (March 17, 1952).
244 P. 2d 877, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 5, 1952).
10246 P. 2d 906, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (July 7, 1952).
1237 P. 2d 1079, 1951-2 C. B, A. Adv. Sh. (Oct. 15, 1951).
2 238 P. 2d 872, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (Nov. 26, 1951).
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Bonding Co. v. Bank of Aurora,2 involving the relatively new motor
vehicle bonds. In the first of these cases, the attorneys who had entered an appearance for both the bonding company and the defaulting dealer permitted a judgment by default to be entered
against the dealer, and thereafter attempted to defend as to the
bonding company by showing that there was no evidence of fraud.
The Court held that the default judgment against the dealer resulted in an automatic judgment against the bonding company, being conclusive proof of the fraud necessary to recover on the bond.
In the second case, where the fraudulent transactions occurred
prior to the effective date of the bond but renewal notes and chattel
mortgages were taken thereafter, the Court denied recovery, hold246 P. 2d 894, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (June 16, 1952).
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ing in effect that no new consideration was advanced by the bank
during the time when the bond was in effect.
The third case of Fifer . Mass. Bonding Co.3 involved a cost
bond in a divorce decree wh. n included attorney fees. Even though
the statute does not authorize such a bond, the Court held that it
had authority to order such a bond, and having executed the same,
the bonding company had no right to refuse to pay in accordance
with its terms.
INSURANCE

In the case of Mutual Insurance v. Daniels,4 our Court had
occasion to consider as a question of first impression a life insurance contract which contained both the standard aviation clause
and the statutory incontestability clause, and more particularly the
question as to whether the first was voided by the second in a case
of death of the insured while piloting a military plane. The Court
ruled that the incontestability clause cannot enlarge the scope of
the insuror's promise, but merely prohibits the company from contesting the validity of the policy at its inception. As a result, the
aviation clause was entitled to full weight and recovery was denied.
In Employers' Mutual v. Nicholas,5 the Court considered a
standard P.U.C. rider on a liability policy, which waives description of the motor vehicle, but obliges the insured to reimburse the
company for losses not specifically covered by the policy which
are paid by the company as a result of this rider. In a suit for reimbursement by the insurance company, recovery was denied on
the theory that the insurance company had settled the case without consulting the insured as to the amount of the settlement.
TORTS

The past year has been significant in that the Court has in
many instances drawn a line and said we will no longer stretch
legal theories out of sympathy for seriously injured litigants. For
instance, in Klatka v. Barker,6 a guest statute case, it was attempted to show that the deceased, a member of the Haxtun band,
was not a guest because the driver of his car was a public spirited
citizen and was receiving benefit from the fact that he was transporting a part of the band, and thus bringing glory to the town of
Haxtun. Recovery was denied with a statement that the benefit
conferred must be sufficiently real, tangible and substantial to serve
as an inducing cause for the transportation. Reliance was also
placed on the terms of the Colorado statute, which requires payment
as distinguished from other statutes which merely require compensation.
Similarly, in Greenwood v. Kier,7 our Court refused to further
extend the family car doctrine to a situation where a corporation
owned the truck, the wife owned stock in the corporation and per'238
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mitted her husband to use the truck to go deer hunting. In a suit
against the wife, recovery was denied. Even though it was shown
that the husband was not employed, the Court found that this fact
did not rebut the presumption that he was the head of the family.
In the interesting case of Whiteside v. Harvey,8 our Court has
adopted the theory of constructive identity in a situation where the
Defendant had entrusted his truck to an employee to pick up a load
of potatoes. The employee, having played cards late at night, asked
his father to drive while he slept. Although the Court repeats that
nominally an employer is not liable for the acts of one whom the
employee permits to drive without authority, in this case the employer was held liable, since the father became the alter-ego of his
son; even though the son was asleep at the time of the accident,
the negligence of his father was imputed to him under this theory
of constructive identity.
The case of Field v. Sisters of Mercy 9 is mentioned only because here the Supreme Court finally permitted a summary judgment to stick. By admissions in the pleadings and depositions, it
appeared that the patient whom the Plaintiff was attempting to
visit in Mercy Hospital was not actually in that hospital. Accordingly, the Plaintiff became merely a licensee and was not entitled
to recover when she tripped over a suitcase in a darkened hall.
In Scott v. Greeley Joslin,10 the Court finally found a situation
where it could apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Here a customer was injured by a falling electric fan in a dressing room.
as to why the fan fell, +he fl,,I4
Although there- .vas no show.
reviewed all of the circumstances which it could conceive as causing the fan to fall and concluded that each must have been because
of the Defendant's negligence.
In Grand Junction v. Lashmett," a child's dress was ignited
by an open flare left by an excavation. The Court found that the
placing of such an open flare was not negligence as a matter of law,
since the utility of such a warning light out-weighed the danger
which was involved. Even in this situation, the Court repeated that
negligence must be proved and cannot be presumed.
In Carr v. Mile High Kennel,12 a customer at the dog track,
walking down the stairs, was injured by other customers playing
leap frog. Once again, recovery was denied because no affirmative
evidence of negligence was produced. The Court once again found
that the track was not an insuror of its customers' safety and
could not be expected to anticipate that its customers would be
playing leap-frog on the stairway.
In McBride v. Woods,'13 a judgment was reversed because the
Court had given an instruction defining unavoidable accident. In
this case, the Defendant had been backing out of a parking place
8239 P. 2d 989, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh.
' 245 P. 2d 1167, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh.
10243 P. 2d 394, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh.
111951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 489 (Aug. 29,
1 242 P. 2d 238, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh.
Is 238 P. 2d 183, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh.
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into a cross-walk, and under these circumstances, the Court held
that it could not have been unavoidable since the act of backing a
car into a cross-walk is such a hazardous undertaking that there
was a duty on the driver to make certain no pedestrian was there.
We cannot conclude this subject of torts without calling attention to our Supreme Court's final complete capitulation to the
4
mechanical world in which we live. In Winterberg v. Thomas,1
the ultimate question to be determined was whether the Plaintiff
had gone through a green light or a red light. Although the Plaintiff testified that he went through a green light, although his testimony was substantiated by another witness, and although there
was testimony that the Defendant at one time had admitted that
the Plaintiff had the green light, and finally despite the fact that
the jury in its verdict believed this testimony and found for the
Plaintiff, our Court nevertheless reversed the verdict, stating that
the court should have taken the case away from the jury because
a city engineer of Denver had testified as a mathematical fact that
the light must have been red.

TAXATION, PUBLIC UTILITIES AND LOCAL GOV'T
STANLEY L. DREXLER

Our Court last year decided 22 cases dealing with these subjects. In view of this fecundity, the probable prolixity of my colleagues, the scope of this program and the limitations of time, I
claim immunity from being held in contempt for treating 16 of
these decisions as unworthy of mention.
TAXATION

Of the six remaining cases, the one most likely to achieve
immortality-at least among my brethern of the tax bar-is
Cass v. Dameron.' I am told by representatives of the Department
of Justice, which represents the taxpayer pursuant to the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, that by the time thesd remarks are
spoken a petition for certiorariwill have been filed by the Attorney
General of the United States in the United States Supreme Court.
Claiborne Dameron, domiciled in Louisiana, in 1948 was a
major in the United States Air Force, stationed at Lowry Field
Air base. He and his family lived in an apartment in Denver. There
he had household goods of an assessed value of $460. On this he
paid under protest to Roy W. Cass Manager of Revenue and ExOfficio Treasurer of the City and County of Denver, a tax of $23.31.
He filed suit to recover this tax and had judgment in the District
Court. Mr. Cass appealed. The Supreme Court reversed.
As I read the applicable provision of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act, Major Dameron's personal property, tangible or
intangible, not used in a commercial enterprise, is denied a situs
for State or local taxation outside of Louisiana. As the Court reads
12246 P. 2d 1058, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (July 7, 1952).
'244 P. 2d 1082, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. (May 12, 1952).
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it, however, in the light of its legislative history, this result obtains
only if Louisiana asserts a tax on the property. Although a State
may tax the tangible personal property of its domiciliaries not
physically present within its borders, most States tax tangible
property on the basis of its physical location on a certain date or
ratably on the basis of its location throughout the year, without
regard to the domicile of the owner. There was no showing that
Louisiana asserted a tax on Major Dameron's household goods in
1948, and our Court concluded that if it denied them a Colorado
situs, they would escape taxation altogether. It reasoned that the
purpose of the provision was to prevent multiple taxation, not to
secure tax exemption, and therefore read into the provision, as I
see it, a requirement that a showing be made that double taxation
will result before the jurisdiction where a soldier's household goods
are located during his military service will be denied the power
to tax them on the basis of their physical presence.
One other decision of the Colorado Supreme Court deals with
taxation. It is PrudentialInsurance Company v. Kavanaugh.2 A
Colorado statute imposes a two per cent tax on the gross amount of
all premiums collected or contracted for during the year on policies
of insurance on Colorado risks or properties. An option common
in life insurance policies permits the insured to use the dividends
allocated out of divisible surplus during the year to purchase additional paid-up insurance under the same contract. The question in
this case is whether the dividends so used constitute additional
premiums subject to the tax. The Court held that they do not.
In a previous decision, the Court held that dividends applied to
reduce the cost of the current premiums did not affect the amount
of such premiums subject to the tax. The decision in the instant
case rests partly upon consistency with the earlier decision, partly
on the authority of an Iowa case construing a similar statute, but
chiefly upon the desirability of avoiding the great administrative
difficulty of determining each year how each insured elected to
treat the dividends allocable to him. Similar statutes are common.
Only in Iowa and Colorado have they been judicially construed on
this point. In most states, including Colorado, the Insurance Departments and Attorneys General, have held additional insurance
purchased under the same contract with dividends therefrom, to
be subject to the tax. It will be interesting to see whether the Colorado decision will bring about litigation or voluntary administrative reversal in the other states.
PUBLIC UTILITIES

Turning from taxation to public utilities, we come, of course,
to Public Utilities Commission v. Telephone Company,3 clearly the
case of the year in this field. As you know, the Court in this case
held that the regulation of telephone rates in Denver is not a local
or municipal matter within the jurisdiction of Denver under the
2240
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Home Rule Amendment but is committed to the State Public Utilities Commission. In so holding the Court ran squarely into Denver
v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 4 holding
such regulation to be a local or municipal matter. The Court was
offered an opportunity to take an easy way out by distinguishing
the 1919 decision on the ground that technological progress since
1919 and the growth of the metropolitan area outside the Denver
city limits have created a new interdependence of inter and intracity telephone facilities, communication and service, but denied itself the blindfold and faced right up to the firing squad, holding
its former decision to be wrong, wrong in 1919 and wrong in 1952,
and expressly reversed itself. The Court pointed out that it would
be intolerable to have telephone rates regulated simultaneously by
the State and by fourteen home rule cities. The Court also questioned its recent decision in Berman v. Denver,5 holding that the
initiation of an ordinance by the people of the City and County of
Denver is the exclusive method available for the exercise of the
City's regulatory power in the utilities field. The Court said, however, that in view of its decision in the instant case, it was unnecessary for it to reconsider its decision in the Berman case
LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The remaining three cases deal with local government. They
are (1) Kingsley v. Denver, striking down a contract for the purchase of voting machines involving, as the Court held, the issuance
of bonds without a vote of the people and the contracting for payments to be made of funds not appropriated for the purpose; (2)
Greenwood Village v. Heckendorf,7 holding that a property owner
who contracts to sell real estate subject to getting it disconnected
from a town retains his status as owner for the purpose of maintaining disconnection proceedings, but that disconnection will not
be permitted if its result would be to divide the town into two areas
wholly separated from each other; and (3) Enos v. District Court,8
holding that a bona fide attempt to comply with the laws creating
a municipal corporation, followed by an exercise of the corporate
franchise creates at least a de facto corporation, the validity of
which may be challenged only by the state, that the district attorney may not permit a private realtor to act on behalf of the state
by giving him permission to bring an ex rel action on behalf of the
people, and pointing out that the effect of a 1921 amendment to the
1908 statutes relating to the incorporation of municipalities is to
give the county court authority to decree that the incorporation is
complete instead of to perform merely ministerial functions. The
moral is that anyone who is unhappy about a proposed municipal
incorporation had better show up in the county court and not wait
around until the mayor and trustees have been elected to bring a
quo warranto action to kick them out of office.
467 Colo. 225, 108 P. 604 (1919).
5120 Colo. 218, 209 P. 2d 754 (1949).
247 P. 2d 805, 1951-2 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. 462 (Aug. 12, 1952).
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